Toward Formalizing Teleportation of Pedagogical Artificial Agents by Angel, John et al.
Toward Formalizing Teleportation of
Pedagogical Artificial Agents
John Angel, Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu, and Selmer Bringsjord
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Lab
Department of Computer Science & Department of Cognitive Science
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) • Troy NY 12180 USA
1 Introduction
Our paradigm for the use of artificial agents to teach requires among other things
that they persist through time in their interaction with human students, in such
a way that they “teleport” or “migrate” from an embodiment at one time t
to a different embodiment at later time t′. In this short paper, we report on
initial steps toward the formalization of such teleportation, in order to enable an
overseeing AI system to establish, mechanically, and verifiably, that the human
students in question will likely believe that the very same artificial agent has
persisted across such times despite the different embodiments.
The plan for the sequel is straightforward, and as follows. After encapsulat-
ing our paradigm for the deployment of artificial agents in service of learning,
and taking note of the fact that the “teleportation”/“migration” problem has
hitherto been treated only informally, we then convey the kernel of our approach
to formalizing agent teleportation between different embodiments, formalize this
kernel to a degree, in order to produce an initial simulation, and then wrap up
with some final remarks.
2 Our Paradigm & Teleportation
A crucial part of our novel paradigm for artificial agents that teach is the en-
gineering of a class of AIs, crucially powered by cognitive logics, able to persist
through days and weeks in their interaction with the humans whose education is
to be thereby enhanced. The artificial agents in our paradigm are able to seam-
lessly “teleport” between heterogenous environments in which a human learner
may find herself as time unfolds; this capacity is intended to provide a contin-
uous educational experience to the human student, and offers the possibility of
human-machine friendship.
In short, our agents need to be “teleportative.” This means that the agent
should be able to be used in multiple hardware environments by a user, such that
the user has the impression of an continuous, uninterrupted interaction with the
very same agent. This helps to reinforce the possibility of a persistent, trusting
relationship between human and machine.
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3 Prior Accounts of Teleportation of Artificial Agents
There is some excellent and interesting prior work on teleporting artificial agents.
Some explore how the consistency of a migrating agent’s memory effects a user’s
perception of a continuous identity [1]. Others shed light on visual cues useful for
convincing users of an agent’s teleportation [6]. In addition, excellent progress has
been made towards the designing of migrating agents [5] and testing real-world
implementations of such agents [2]. Unfortunately for our purposes, the prior art
is informal. Our goal is to capture teleportation formally, and on the strength
of that formalization to enable an overseeing AI system to prove, or minimally
justify rigorously, that the teleportation in question is indeed believable.
4 The Kernel of the Formalization
In the longstanding quasi-technical literature on personal identity in philosophy
there is a strong tradition of trying to work out a rigorous account of when person
p1 at t1 (= pt1) is identical with person pt2 on the basis of shared memories
between pt1 and pt2 .
The goal of our initial formalization is to build a system that can find a proof
for when it believes that a student believes two embodied agents are the same
pt1 ≡ pt2 . The system can conclude that the student believes two embodiments
to be the same if the system can find a proof that it believes that the student
believes that the two embodiments have a belief β at specific times that cannot
be believed by more than one agent. If the system fails to find such a proof or
argument, then the system can take corrective actions to make it more explicit to
the human that the embodiments are the same. Note that formalization requires
the system to understand beliefs of agents which might themselves be about
beliefs of other agents (and so on).
5 Initial Formalization and Simulation
The requirement that the system understand the student’s beliefs about other
embodied agents’ beliefs implies that we need to have a sufficiently expressive
system BDI logics (belief/desire/intentions) have a long tradition of being used
to model such agents [7]. For our formalization, we use a system that is a proper
superset1 of such logics.
We specifically use the formal system µC in [4]. The system is a modal exten-
sion of first-order logic, and has the following modal operators: B, for belief, and
P for perception. The syntax and inference schemata of the system are shown
below. φ is a meta-variable for formulae, and A(. . .) is any first-order atomic
formula. Assume that we have at hand a first-order alphabet augmented with
a finite set of constant symbols for agents {a1, . . . , an} and a countably infinite
set of constant symbols for times {t0, t1, . . .}. (Sometimes we use a for ai and t
for ti below.) {x, y, z, . . .} are first-order variables. The grammar is follows:
1 With respect to modal operators and inference schemata.
φ ::=
{
A(. . .) | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | φ↔ ψ | ∀x.φP(a, t, φ) | B(a, t, φ)
B(a, t, φ) stands for agent a at time t believing φ and P(a, t, φ) stands for agent
a at time t perceiving φ. The base inference schemata are given here:
All propositional natural-deduction inference schemata.[RND0 ]
Natural-deduction quantifier inference schemata treating modal formulae opaquely[RND1 ]
P(a, t1, φ1), Γ ` t1 < t2
B(a, t2, φ)
[RP]
B(a, t1, φ1), . . . ,B(a, tm, φm), {φ1, . . . , φm} ` φ, Γ ` ti < t
B(a, t, φ)
[RB]
Now assume that there is a background set of axioms Γ we are working with.
We have available the basic theory of arithmetic (so we can assert statements of
the form x < y). RP tells us how perceptions get translated into beliefs. RB is an
inference schema that lets us model idealized agents that have their beliefs closed
under the µC proof theory. While normal humans are not deductively closed, this
lets us model more closely how deliberate agents such as organizations and more
strategic actors reason. Reasoning is performed through a novel first-order modal
logic theorem prover, ShadowProver, which uses a technique called shadowing
to achieve speed without sacrificing consistency in the system [3].2
Fig. 1. Simulation
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The simulation is set up as a reasoning problem from a set of given assump-
tions to a goal (see Figure 2). In the formalization shown below, the system
believes that the student believes two embodiments to have the same identity
if the embodiments at different times believe some personal object to have the
same property (see assumption A4). For instance, assume that the student’s
watch is a personal object. At time t1, we have (embodiment a) believing that
the watch is stopped, and at time t2 we also have (embodiment b) believing the
same. From these assumptions, the system can derive that the student believes
that the embodiments are the same (see Figure 1 for an overview).
2 The prover is available in both Java and Common Lisp and can be obtained at: https:
//github.com/naveensundarg/prover. The underlying first-order prover is SNARK,
available at: http://www.ai.sri.com/∼stickel/snark.html.
Fig. 2. Simulation: ShadowProver goes through the below in ≈ 2.8 seconds.
6 Concluding Remarks; Next Steps
We readily admit to having only taken initial steps toward the formalization of
teleportation for artificial agents. The simulation we have presented does seem
to indicate to us that things are scalable — but of course only time and experi-
mentation will tell. Finally, it’s important to note that we haven’t herein sought
to address the educational efficacy of our approach, nor the specific learning
value of persistent teaching agents across embodiments.
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